Is sustainable transport policy sustainable? by Eliasson, Jonas & Proost, Stef
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
DPS14.17 
JUNE 2014 
Is sustainable transport 
policy sustainable? 
 
Jonas ELIASSON and Stef PROOST  
Energy, Transport & Environment 
Faculty of Economics 
And Business 
Is sustainable transport policy sustainable? 
Jonas Eliassona, Stef Proostb 
 
a Center for Transport Studies, KTH, Stockholm, Sweden 
b Center for Economic Studies, KULeuven, Belgium & Center for Transport Studies, KTH, Stockholm, 
Sweden 
Revised April 20141 
 
Abstract 
The paper challenges part of the sustainable transport literature. Sustainable transport plans often 
focus on reducing carbon emissions in a specific city, region or country, and this neglects two 
handicaps of strong unilateral action. The first is that climate is a global commons problem, so a 
strong binding international climate agreement is unlikely. The second is that a unilateral reduction 
of oil consumption may be partially, or even completely, offset by market responses – in some 
circumstances, cumulative emissions may even come earlier (the “green paradox”). When a coalition 
of the willing reduces oil use in the transport sector, this may delay rather than reduce total 
emissions. This requires rethinking climate policies for the transport sector: What policies remain 
cost effective in reducing greenhouse gas emissions?  
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1 Introduction 
There is consensus that policies must be sustainable in the sense that they respect the living 
conditions of both present and future generations. Sustainable transport policy encompasses many 
related but distinct aspects, such as climate, air quality, security, traffic safety, and health. In this 
paper, we focus on perhaps the most difficult and contentious aspect of sustainable transport policy, 
namely curbing the climate effects of the transportation sector. It is well established that man-made 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions contribute to global warming with potentially disastrous 
consequences (IPCC, 2013). The contentious issue, then, is not whether GHG emissions need to be 
reduced, but what measures are effective. With thirteen percent of total GHG emissions, the 
transport sector is not the most important polluting sector globally, but its share is growing quickly: 
the GHG emissions from the transport sector are expected to double by 2050 if no action is 
undertaken (ITF/OECD, 2012). In many countries, it already makes up a substantial share of total 
GHG emissions. 
In this paper, we challenge the apparent focus on unilateral action in public debate, applied policy 
and much of the research literature, and question the effectiveness of several common policy 
recommendations. We discuss what the reasons might be for the widespread advocacy or adoption 
of policies that may be largely ineffective. Finally, we discuss what policy measures could be effective 
in mitigating climate effects from transportation.  
Our main observations can be summarized as follows. All GHG emissions enter the atmosphere and 
will affect the world’s climate for the next 100 to 300 years. Emission reduction efforts in any single 
country, even if it is large, will hardly affect the climate. Despite this, there is a large literature on 
potentials, methods, and costs for emission reductions from single countries, regions, or even cities. 
Such policy analyses are meaningful if they are interpreted as preparations for an (as yet 
hypothetical) global climate agreement where individual actors will agree on their respective targets 
for emission reduction. We review the sustainable transport literature and discuss how it can be put 
in a meaningful context in section 2. 
Since any single actor is small, unilateral emission reductions will not make an appreciable reduction 
in global GHG emissions. But in fact, it is even more problematic : due to how oil markets work, a 
reduction in oil consumption—even  by a coalition of countries—could be partly or even completely 
offset by a corresponding increase in oil consumption either by countries outside the coalition 
(spatial leakage) or by future generations (intertemporal leakage). Intertemporal leakage is likely to 
occur even if the willing coalition encompasses all countries in the world. The intuitive reason is that 
actors with cheap oil reserves will eventually sell all of their oil as long as the oil price is higher than 
the extraction cost. Unilateral reductions in oil consumption by a coalition of willing countries may 
increase the period during which the oil is sold and hence delay rather than reduce emissions. This 
may result in a decrease in incentives to find and extract non-conventional oil sources (e.g. oil sands). 
But the depressing message is that unilateral cuts in oil consumption are not only too small to make a 
global difference; market reactions will water down initial reductions of oil consumption 
substantially, and may even erase them completely. This does not apply to all energy resources to 
the same extent, though. When the consumption of coal drops, there will be a reduction of 
production and no shift of production into the future, because, with ample coal reserves in the 
world, the difference between the extraction cost of coal and the world price of coal is much smaller 
than in the case of oil. The mechanisms summarized here and the implications for transport policy 
are discussed in section 3. 
Since global warming is a global problem, international agreements are necessary. Unfortunately, 
both experience and theoretical analyses suggest that such agreements are unlikely to be reached, 
unlikely to be obeyed if reached, and difficult to enforce if not obeyed. There are several reasons for 
this: enforcement difficulties, heterogeneous views of costs and benefits among countries, and 
limited accountability of signatories, to name but a few. A possible motivation for a country to 
undertake unilateral emission reductions could be that the country believes that this might increase 
the possibility of reaching multilateral agreements, perhaps by signaling other countries to the 
seriousness of the problem, or that the cost of emission reductions are in fact not prohibitively high. 
But if marginal abatement costs are increasing and negotiations have a quid-pro-quo logic (parties 
will only agree to cut emissions if other parties do so too), unilateral emission cuts or binding 
promises of future cuts may, in fact, reduce the possibility to reach an agreement since prior cuts 
decrease the ability of a country to promise additional cuts in the negotiation process. International 
agreements are discussed in section 4. 
None of these arguments or problems is new and they should be familiar to politicians, researchers, 
and NGOs. This raises the question of what might motivate the widespread advocacy for and 
promises of substantial unilateral emission reductions. We discuss some possible such motivations in 
section 5.  
Finally, in light of these rather depressing observations, we discuss implications for the effectiveness 
of sustainable transport policy measures in section 6.  
2 Transport GHG reductions – research and policy 
Some countries and regions are forerunners in terms of sustainable transport and climate objectives. 
The EC is very explicit in its Transport Roadmap 2050 (EC, 2011):  “Looking 40 years ahead, it is clear 
that transport cannot develop along the same path. If we stick to the business as usual approach, the 
oil dependence of transport might still be a little below 90%, with renewable energy sources only 
marginally exceeding the 10% target set for 2020. CO2 emissions from transport would remain one 
third higher than their 1990 level by 2050.” This challenge has been translated into precise objectives 
for the medium to long term. The ambitious GHG objectives require policies like phasing out 
conventionally fuelled cars in cities by 2050. Overall, the target is to reduce carbon emissions by 60% 
in 2050 compared to 2010. Several countries and cities are making similar plans. Of course one can 
treat these as vague plans, as possible ideas for a policy or preparations for future negotiations. But 
the words are also followed by action at least to some extent, both at the EU level and in many 
individual countries. For example, all EU countries have already implemented strong fuel economy 
targets for cars since more than 10 years, and there is a massive support for the development of 
electric vehicles. These actions and plans are costly and their effects need to be assessed.  
One can classify the research literature on sustainable transport policy into two approaches. The first 
one is more local and planning-oriented; the other approach is the more traditional economic 
approach to transport and environment.  
Banister (2008) is the classic paper on sustainable mobility policy and planning. He advocates a 
different spatial development leading to denser cities, reducing the need for car use and long 
distance trips. The paper is very much in the urban planning tradition and also pays attention to 
public acceptability constraints. The sustainable mobility strategy is expected to reduce long term 
energy use and carbon emissions as a consequence, but it is not necessarily the main objective.  
Later we see more papers focusing specifically on the reduction of carbon emissions as one of the 
important objectives of transport policy. Some papers focus on reducing emissions in a city and some 
are on a country or on the EU level.  
Hickman, Ashiru, & Banister (2010) study how GHG emissions can be strongly reduced in London 
using different transport policy approaches. With a reduction of emission of 80% by 2050, the British 
GHG emission reduction targets are very ambitious. The authors find that it will be difficult to contain 
GHG emissions using narrowly defined transport policies like speed restriction, modal choice, 
emission taxes, etc. Their conclusion is that a deeper change of mobility patterns is needed to reduce 
carbon emissions drastically.  
Crozet & Lopez-Ruiz (2013) present a scenario exercise for France and conclude that a reduction of 
80% of GHG emissions can be achieved, with more than half coming from technological change and 
the rest from behavioral adaptation. This behavioral change is a structural break, away from air 
transport, and with substantial changes in urban mobility patterns.  
Musso & Rothengatter (2013) present a methodological framework to achieve ambitious transport 
policy objectives. They use a multi-objective programming formulation that allows them to derive 
shadow prices as well as a set of other policies to achieve the targets. The targets determine shadow 
prices of emissions and the authors contrast this with the more traditional external cost approach. 
The paper uses the approach to discuss the EC transport and climate policies (EC, 2011). Overall, they 
find that the multi-dimensional approach combining fuel efficiency standards, infrastructure policies, 
and modal choice strategies are the way to go to achieve the targets.  
Nakamura & Hayashi (2013) classify the different strategies that have been used over the world to 
reduce carbon emissions in the transport sector. They use a double classification 
(avoid/shift/improve and technology/regulation/information economy) and compare what policies 
have been pursued by different cities and continents. This international comparison shows that there 
is no single solution for all cities to reduce carbon emissions. Developing countries may benefit more 
from land use planning, while developed countries had better count on advanced public transport 
systems and on low emission vehicles.  
Most sustainable transport policy papers in the planning tradition use an (ambitious) emission 
reduction objective for the transport sector and focus on the transport sector of a city or country. 
We return to the question how this should be put into context.  
The traditional economic approach to environmental issues in the transport sector is surveyed in 
Proost & Van Dender (2012). The economic approach starts from a marginal damage estimate 
($/ton) for carbon emissions. The marginal damage value is derived from integrated assessment 
models that model benefits and costs of climate action for the world (Nordhaus & Yang (1996) and 
Stern (2008) are the best known examples). This marginal damage value is then used at an individual 
country level to assess climate policy for all sectors of the economy. These common values vary a lot 
due to the inherent uncertainties in the economic and climate modeling. Tol (2012) surveys the 
marginal damage estimates for the world and cites values of $5 (discount rate of 3%) to $76 
(discount rate of 0%). Because a common value is used for the whole world, there is no absolute 
reduction target for the transport sector. The marginal damage is used to judge the choice of 
instruments and the overall level of efforts in the transport sector. This has generated an extensive 
literature on the merits of fuel efficiency standards and gasoline taxes and, to a lesser extent, on land 
use policies (Proost & Van Dender, 2012). There is no consensus on the need for efficiency standards 
unless if there is a strong belief that consumers are very myopic, but the evidence for this is weak 
(Busse, Knittel & Zettelmeyer, 2013) or mixed (Greene, 2010). When having to choose between taxes 
and efficiency standards, gasoline taxes are often preferred as instrument because they also address 
other externalities such as congestion. Other transport policy instruments (road pricing, parking, 
public transport subsidies, etc.) can be useful but do not target carbon emissions and are therefore 
not usually considered as climate policy instruments in the transport economics literature.  
A characteristic of the transport economics papers is that they use a marginal climate damage 
estimate to determine the extent of efforts in the transport sector and that they, just like the 
planning-oriented literature, focus on the best choice of instruments for their country. If the marginal 
damage cost is replaced by an (exogenous) shadow price for carbon emissions for the whole 
economy, then the analyses and insights remain largely unchanged because the shadow cost plays 
the same role as the marginal damage cost in guiding investment and other choices.    
Most of this literature attempts to answer the question of what targets can be reached, how, and at 
what cost, for a given city/region/country. That is useful to know given an international climate 
agreement with binding targets for individual countries or when preparing negotiations for such an 
international agreement, since countries can get better information about what obligations it can 
shoulder and what it will cost. But this literature should not be interpreted as directly addressing the 
question of how GHG emissions can be substantially reduced. This is because each individual country 
is too small to make a difference – not to speak of cities or regions – but even more because any 
unilateral emission reduction, even by coalitions of countries, runs the risk of being, at least partly, 
offset or even erased by market responses. Such mechanisms are discussed in the next section. 
Countries strongly dependent on oil imports, like the EU, can motivate the reduction of oil use in the 
transport sector as a risk reduction strategy2. This requires a correct assessment of the world oil 
market events3 and a comparison with other risk reduction strategies. Besides a reduction of oil 
consumption, this should also include larger stockpiles, more natural gas vehicles, more indigenous 
oil production, etc.  
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 “Oil will become scarcer in future decades, sourced increasingly from uncertain supplies. As the IEA has 
recently pointed out, the less successful the world is in decarbonising, the greater will be the oil price increase. 
In 2010, the oil import bill was around € 210 billion for the EU. If we do not address this oil dependence, 
people’s ability to travel – and our economic security – could be severely impacted with dire consequences on 
inflation, trade balance and the overall competitiveness of the EU economy.” (EC, 2011) 
3
 Kilian (2008) shows how many oil “supply” shocks were either demand shocks or were mitigated by other 
dominant suppliers. Knittel & Pindyck (2013) show how for the period 1999-2012, speculation had little, if any, 
effect on prices and volatility. 
3 Could oil consumption reductions be futile? The “green paradox” 
GHG reductions by any single country will only make a small dent in global GHG emissions, since even 
the large polluters are small compared to total global emissions. But if many emitting countries enter 
a “coalition of the willing”, would they not together be able to substantially reduce global emissions? 
The problem is that a reduction of fossil fuel consumptions is partially, and in some circumstances 
even completely, offset by various processes known as carbon leakages. 
“Carbon leakage” refers to the phenomenon that if a country (or coalition of countries) reduces its 
consumption of fossil fuels by some amount, accumulated global emissions are only reduced by 
some fraction of that amount. Such offsets of the initial emission reductions are of two kinds, called 
spatial leakage and intertemporal leakage. Leakages are especially important when fuel reserves are 
limited, because this scarcity will cause market price to be above marginal extraction cost, a so called 
scarcity rent. Scarcity rents mean that there is room for a price reaction over space and time if 
consumption is reduced, and this price reaction offsets at least some of the initial consumption 
reduction by increasing consumption in other places or points in time. The market price for oil is 
equal to the extraction cost for the reserves that are most costly to extract (with profit). Since there 
are other reserves which are much less costly to extract, the price for these cheap reserves will 
include a substantial scarcity rent. This means that the leakage effects are usually so substantial that 
any analysis of climate policies needs to take them into account. Otherwise, emission reduction 
benefits are virtually guaranteed to be overestimated. In extreme cases, leakages may even erase the 
initial demand reduction completely. Other fossil fuels are also limited in supply, such as natural gas, 
so their price also includes a scarcity rent. Coal, on the hand, is in abundant supply, so the scarcity 
rent is negligible: its price is close to its marginal extraction cost (plus costs for transportation and 
similar things).  
Spatial leakage can occur when some region in the world (e.g. a coalition of countries) regulates its 
GHG emissions and some other region does not. First, regulation may cause production generating 
GHG emissions to move from the regulating region to the non-regulating one. From the point of view 
of the regulating region, emissions have decreased, but global emissions have obviously changed 
less, and may even have increased. Moving production is not a big problem for the transport sector, 
which might be one reason that GHG emissions are taxed so much higher than emissions from other 
sectors. But there is a second, more important mechanism, namely that a reduction in fossil fuel 
consumption in the regulated region may cause the world market price for that fuel to fall; if the fuel 
price includes a scarcity rent, the price fall is virtually guaranteed. The price decrease will cause 
consumption to increase in the non-regulating region, so the initial emission reduction in the 
regulating region is offset to some extent by increased emissions in the non-regulating region. Spatial 
leakage has been estimated to offset the initial emission reduction by 10-30% (Babiker & Rutherford, 
2005).  
Intertemporal leakage can occur even if all regions regulate their emissions. The intuition starts from 
the simple observation that as long as the market price for oil (or any other fossil fuel) is higher than 
its extraction cost, those who own oil reserves will eventually sell them all; the only question is how 
fast and at what price. This mechanism can be formalized in a simple Hotelling model. Take a fixed 
stock S of a fossil fuel resource with a substantial rent (such as conventional oil) and production cost 
c and assume that these reserves are spread over a few suppliers so there is perfect competition4. 
The world demand function for the fossil fuel is given. This world demand function has a maximum 
willingness to pay for the fossil fuel P*, which is the cost of a backstop technology that can substitute 
for the fossil fuel, e.g. renewable electricity. Every producer of fossil fuel will compare the profits 
they can make by selling today rather than tomorrow or in 10 years etc. Given an interest rate r, the 
inter-temporal arbitrage condition for profit maximizing suppliers results in an equilibrium profile of 
prices such that the rent (price – extraction cost) increases at the rate of interest. In Figure 2, the 
solid curve 1 is an equilibrium price profile. A second characteristic is that the stock S is consumed 
completely in the last period when the choke price P* is reached. So the choice of the choke price P* 
and the inter-temporal arbitrage condition lead to the price profile. These conditions hold at any 
moment in time, so that whenever new information comes available the price profile is adapted.  
 
Figure 2 Effect on world fossil fuel equilibrium prices of a climate effort of one country (2) and of 
an improvement of the backstop technology (3) compared to the reference (1) 
Consider first a significant, deliberate, and long lasting emission reduction in the transport sector in a 
few countries. This means a decrease of oil consumption by these countries. A decrease in the world 
demand implies that one needs a new price profile over time. The current price of oil will decrease 
and with the new equilibrium price profile (2), the world will use oil for a longer period. However, the 
total quantity of carbon emissions will not decrease: emissions will only be delayed.  
Consider next an improvement of the backstop technology of oil, brought about by strong R&D 
efforts – say the electric vehicle, hydrogen vehicle, or biofuel vehicle fuelled by nuclear or 
renewables. This will imply new inter-temporal price profiles. The maximum price at which oil can be 
sold will decrease. Taking into account that sellers want to sell all their reserves, this implies a drop in 
the current oil price and that emissions will come earlier, while total emissions over the whole time 
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 Anyway, if we repeat the reasoning for an imperfectly competitive oil market, one obtains similar results.  
period still remain unchanged. Only when the backstop technology offers an alternative to oil that is 
cheaper than the extraction cost c would the whole world switch to the clean alternative. The 
counterintuitive effect that an effort to improve alternatives to oil may cause emissions to happen 
earlier is called the  green paradox (Sinn, 2008).  
Given these assumptions, the bottom line is simple: ultimately all oil will be used, so a reduction in 
consumption can only, at best, delay emissions. Fortunately, these discouraging conclusions do not 
necessary hold in more elaborate models (see van der Werf and di Maria (2012) for a review). It may 
be possible to reduce accumulated emissions if the cost of the backstop technology decreases over 
time, since delaying emissions can then mean that the backstop technology will outcompete oil 
earlier, decreasing the stock of reserves that can be exploited with a profit. It can also be possible to 
reduce accumulated emissions if marginal extraction costs are increasing, i.e. if oil gets more and 
more expensive to extract. In that case, either demand reductions or improved backstop technology 
may reduce accumulated emissions in some circumstances. On the other hand, as we have seen, if 
R&D efforts are increased so the future backstop cost decreases, or if future demand is expected to 
be lower than today, producers may choose to sell their reserves earlier than otherwise, and total 
emissions remain unchanged. 
Fisher and Salant (2013) analyse a model where the world is divided into one region which regulates 
emissions through an emission tax, and one region which does not regulate emissions. The price of 
fossil fuel includes a scarcity rent, and the backstop technology gets cheaper over time. This means 
that both spatial and intertemporal leakages may occur. They show that accumulated emissions tend 
to decrease the larger share of emissions the regulating region stands for, the higher the emission tax 
is, and the faster the backstop technology improves. These are all intuitive and somewhat comforting 
results: in many circumstances, it may in fact be possible to reduce total emissions by trying to 
extend the coalition of regulating countries, introduce emission policies and improve alternative 
technologies.  
However, several of the discouraging conclusions from the simplest “green paradox” model remain. , 
The crucial determinant accumulated emissions time is how the cost for the backstop technology 
compares to the marginal extraction cost of oil – not the market price of oil. Since the market price 
includes a scarcity rent, producers will continue to sell their reserves until the backstop cost falls 
below the extraction cost. It is a common mistake to compare costs for backstop technologies to the 
price of oil on the world market, thinking that it will be enough to beat the market price for oil to 
make oil-based technologies uncompetitive and obsolete. But clearly, this is naïve: the relevant 
comparison when analyzing alternative technologies is the extraction cost of conventional oil 
reserves, and these are unfortunately often far below the market price for oil. Demand reductions 
may decrease the market price for oil and hence reduce accumulated emissions if oil reserves have 
different extraction costs; but still, all oil reserves with extraction costs below the market price will 
be extracted. Efforts to decrease the backstop cost may still cause a “green paradox” effect where 
emissions come earlier. The green paradox may also apply to cases where there are policy 
announcement effects: if implementation of policies and international agreements takes a lot of 
time, resource owners may temporarily increase production. 
Note that this applies to oil and other fuels with substantial scarcity rents. The situation is different 
for coal. Since there is an almost unlimited supply of coal, the market price is roughly equal to 
marginal production costs5. Hence, a demand reduction is not offset through price reactions over 
space and time to the same extent. Hence, it is often more effective to reduce emissions from coal 
than from oil.  
Unfortunately, there are large reserves of oil with extraction costs well below the cost for alternative 
transportation technologies in the foreseeable future. The only way to prevent these reserves from 
being used is to convince oil-producing countries to keep them in the ground, through conviction, 
compensation or coercion. One drastic policy option, suggested by Harstad (2012), is that climate-
conscious countries buy the deposits of fossil fuels in other countries in order not to use them. In his 
analyses, the most efficient policy would be to buy the reserves that are the most carbon intensive 
(coal, non-conventional oil) and the most costly to extract, as they are cheaper for the country that 
does not want to use them. The practical difficulties with such supply-side policies are of course 
considerable. It can be very costly for the buying countries, enforcing that the reserves are indeed 
never used is not trivial, it increases the incentives to find more fossil fuel reserves, and if total fuel 
reserves are large, the effect might be small compared to the cost for buying country.  
So what are the implications for climate-mitigating policies in the transport sector? First, any 
assessment of effects, benefits and costs of proposed policies needs to take into account that 
emissions reductions will be at least partly offset by spatial and intertemporal leakages. Second, all 
oil reserves will eventually be used up to the point where marginal extraction costs equal the cost for 
alternative technologies. The good news is that demand reductions can make it unprofitable to 
extract the reserves that are most costly to extract. The bad news is that there are large reserves of 
oil that will be profitable to extract even given significant demand reductions, since extraction costs 
are so low. Demand reductions can also reduce accumulated emissions by delaying oil consumption 
until other technological alternatives have improved so much that oil-based technologies become 
obsolete. But when judging the potential of new technologies to reduce oil consumption, the cost of 
the new technology must be compared to marginal extraction costs of oil reserves, not the market 
price for oil. This gives a more discouraging perspective on the viability of alternative technologies. 
Fourth, it is more effective to reduce emissions from coal than from oil, since the lack of scarcity rent 
in the coal price means that spatial and intertemporal leakage will be moderate or minimal. This has 
implications for what benefits would be generated by an electrification of the transport system, in 
the form of electric vehicles or high-speed trains. Replacing oil-driven cars with electric ones may be 
a dubious policy if electricity is coal-generated at the margin. The net effect may be that accumulated 
oil consumption remains virtually unchanged while global coal consumption increases. 
4 Are international climate agreements likely? 
All greenhouse gas emissions enter the atmosphere and will affect the world’s climate for the next 
100 to 300 years. Emission reduction efforts in one country, even if it is large country, will hardly 
affect its own climate. Hence, international cooperation is needed. International cooperation is also 
necessary to reduce spatial leakage, as explained in the previous section. 
International climate negotiations started in Rio de Janeiro (1992) and led to a first agreement in 
Kyoto (1997). These negotiations are an ongoing process and at present, one is still looking for a 
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 Haftendorn &  Holz, (2010) show how the international market for coal is rather competitive so that 
market prices are approaching the marginal production costs. 
successor to the Kyoto agreement that has been extended from 2013 to 2020. Up to now, the 
success of the climate negotiations has been rather limited: there is only limited participation (the 
US, China, and India did not join) and many of the signatories have not complied with their promises.  
The signing of an environmental agreement is a complex process. Preparation by technical experts, 
the political process of each country that determines its negotiation position, the treaty negotiation 
process itself, and finally ratification all contribute to this complexity. Theoretical analyses of 
negotiations have shown why agreements are difficult to reach, why they are unstable, and why they 
are unlikely to be followed or enforced. The mechanisms at work can be illustrated using a simplified 
representation, where the negotiation is a simple game between countries. We will summarize some 
of the main insights from these theoretical analyses.  
According to cooperative game theory, if the benefits and costs of climate policy are known by all 
countries, it is always possible to make an agreement that reaches an optimal level of abatement and 
which is beneficial for all countries. . All one needs is a correct computation of costs and benefits by 
country and transfers among countries so that all parties gain. This is the idea of the grand coalition 
(Eyckmans & Tulkens, 2003). Unfortunately, while it may be possible to reach a wide agreement, 
enforcing it will be very difficult. International agreements, such as Kyoto, have been signed by 
coalitions of the willing, but the agreements were not observed by all signatories. Contrary to 
environmental problems at the country scale, there is no global authority that can enforce 
international environmental agreements. One country might introduce trade sanctions against non-
complying countries, but such enforcement actions are also costly for the country taking the 
sanctions and will not be easily undertaken, as they are costly for one country but benefiting all other 
signatories.  
Barrett (1994) reaches firm conclusions using a simple model with identical countries and constant 
marginal benefits of abatement. He defines self-enforcing international environmental agreements 
as agreements that are such that every country that joins the agreement is better off within the 
agreement than outside the agreement and vice versa for those outside the agreement. He finds that 
the equilibrium number of signatories in an international environmental game that is played only 
once equals 3, whatever the number of countries in the world. So there is hope for a small 
improvement compared to the Nash equilibrium, but the overall result is close to the typical 
outcome of a tragedy of the commons problem: each country only considers its own costs and 
benefits rather than the benefits for the whole world.  
These results apply to a “one shot game”, i.e. a game that is played over and over again without 
players taking past or future behavior of the other players into account. One could also think about 
the behavior of countries as more consistent with more continuity over time. The game could be 
seen as a repeated game, in which each country can start by cooperating and punish those that stop 
making effort by also stopping its own efforts and doing this forever. When the future is sufficiently 
important, the sanction of stopping cooperation forever is important and Barrett proves that more 
effective international agreements become possible, but the result remains far from the grand 
coalition. But, one could also argue that a one shot game is the right concept given that the political 
majorities in countries can change and that a new government is not responsible for what the 
previous government did (think about blaming Obama for Bush’s poor climate negotiations 
behavior).  
The simple Barrett model uses smooth damage functions, but climate change damage is highly 
uncertain and may not be smooth at all. Indeed, it may even be catastrophic. The risk of very high, 
catastrophic damage is the main motivation for the calls for stringent climate policies by Stern (2008)  
and many others. Modeling a catastrophe is difficult. In negotiations, therefore, it is important to 
know what the threshold is that triggers the catastrophe. Barrett (2013) models a catastrophe with a 
damage function that jumps when the threshold is exceeded. Assume first that there is no 
uncertainty on the exact threshold (say 3°C warming should not be exceeded) and the damage of the 
catastrophe is extremely high compared to the abatement cost per country, then an agreement in 
which all countries coordinate to avoid the catastrophe can be self-enforcing. Because if one country 
defects, it knows it may be responsible for a catastrophe and this means that there are far higher 
chances for a successful international agreement.  
Uncertainty about the extent of the catastrophe is not crucial as long as the damage is high enough. 
Unfortunately, Barrett (2013) shows that uncertainty about the threshold itself is more problematic 
for international negotiations. Assume that one starts with a division of effort among all countries 
such that the catastrophe is certainly avoided. A country defecting and reducing its abatement 
efforts is now only responsible for an increase in the probability of a catastrophe and the expected 
sanction is therefore less important. This acts as an incentive not to comply with the agreement and 
to free-ride on the others.  
This does not imply that international negotiations are not important. Glazer and Proost (2012) look 
at international negotiations as a way to allow a minister in one country to learn about the beliefs 
held by a minister in another country, thus pooling information. Partial international agreements can 
also be a step forward if they take into account the possible adverse reactions on the energy 
markets. In conclusion, reaching a global climate agreement is very unlikely according to economic 
theoretical analyses, and, up to now, reality has not proved theory wrong.  
5 Why are unilateral GHG targets so widespread? 
An important part of the transport research community and many governments seem to believe that 
unilateral carbon reduction policies in the transport sector are justified and effective. In the light of 
the above, this seems to present two puzzles. The first is why there is such a large support for 
ambitious unilateral goals and policies. The second is the apparent focus on reduction in the 
transport sector. We will discuss these in turn. 
Unilateral actions – “going first”, “leading the way” - has been the first step for the development of a 
successful policy for many environmental issues. Acid rain, tropospheric and stratospheric ozone are 
three international problems for which significant progress has been made over the last 20-30 years. 
The initiative was often in the hands of a few initiating countries. For example, Glazer and Proost 
(2012) see the reduction of CFC emissions (responsible for stratospheric ozone) as an example of 
unilateral actions that triggered other nations to take effective action.  They rely on the study by 
Murdoch and Sandler (1997) of the national CFC reduction policies in the years before the Montreal 
protocol entered into force. The long negotiation and information exchange before the Montreal 
protocol and the emission abatement of some countries changed the information on which countries 
decided how to act. This information, which suggested that control of CFCs could yield large benefits 
at low cost, induced both signatories, and non-signatories, to reduce emissions of CFCs. The support 
for the treaty by the United States, not considered a strong supporter of environmental action, 
suggested to other countries that action was worthwhile, inducing other countries to reduce 
emissions.  What makes these previous environmental problems different from climate change? Why 
can the initiators of a strong climate policy not expect the same success?  
There are four key differences between climate change and acid rain, tropospheric, and stratospheric 
ozone. First, the three latter environmental problems have a shorter horizon (a few days 
(tropospheric ozone) to ten years or more (acid rain etc) instead of 50 to 300 years for climate), so 
the current generation of politicians may see some of the benefits. Second, the three problems 
mentioned have a more regional dimension than climate change and this helps to build a coalition of 
the willing because neighboring countries need each other also for other transboundary issues. Third, 
the costs of strong reductions are much higher in the case of carbon: strong reductions of carbon 
emissions may cost a few percent of GDP because there are no easy end-of-pipe solutions. It is 
possible to reduce the sulfur content of fuel oil in the refinery at a low cost and reduce acid rain or 
replace CFC’s by a less stratospheric ozone eating substance but there is no such alternative for 
reducing carbon emissions. Fourth, emission reductions are offset by spatial and intertemporal 
leakages. 
It is curious that despite all these handicaps, there is still a significant coalition of politicians in favor 
of strong unilateral carbon emission reductions. There are several possible answers to this. First, 
advocates of unilateral reductions may honestly believe that they are effective. Above, we have 
argued that emission reductions will be offset through spatial and intertemporal leakages, making 
many conventional climate policies ineffective, or at least less effective than they appear at face 
value. But these mechanisms are not obvious and sometimes appear counterintuitive, so it is 
perfectly possible that at least some decision-makers and activists overestimate the effectiveness of 
many policies.  
Second, they may hope that by setting an example, other countries can be convinced that the climate 
problem should be taken seriously, or that emission reductions are less costly than the other 
countries had thought, or both. This could make a global climate agreement more likely, or at least 
induce more countries to enter a coalition of the willing.  
Third, they may hope that strong climate policies will accelerate the pace of technological 
development of alternative energy sources. This would be a kind of incubator strategy: demand for 
alternative technologies can be increased through subsidies, or taxing conventional technologies, 
and then once development has taken place, taxes and subsidies can be phased out. Policy 
experiments may also be useful for finding the most efficient emission-reduction strategies, in the 
hope that lessons can then be applied by other countries which want to reduce carbon emissions. 
Fourth, there are also several political economy explanations. Politicians may view current promises 
and plans as unimportant as they will remain largely just plans and will never be realized; however, 
they attract the votes of the green part of the population that want to do something. There is a large 
body of literature (surveyed in Besley (2006)) that study how inefficient policies can result from the 
desire of politicians to stay in office. If the pivotal voter happens to like climate policy or if the 
climate policy can act as a commitment device because only certain politicians will continue a 
particular type of policy, this could explain particular policies (Robinson & Torvik, 2005).Moreover, 
there are mechanisms that explain “extreme” policies. For instance, Majumdar and Mukand (2004) 
show how reputational concerns distort an incumbent’s policy choices. They demonstrate that an 
official with low ability who wants to signal high ability may inefficiently experiment by undertaking a 
new policy initiative that he knows is likely to fail. Some of the “extreme” policy choices may also be 
driven by the international context. Indeed, when the elected official must later bargain with other 
parties, extreme views may increase his bargaining power and generate larger benefits to his 
supporters. According to Helm (2010), climate policy, and in particular the EU emission trading 
system is an example of rent capture by carbon intensive industry that saw its profits increase by the 
grandfathered rights.  
The second major puzzle is the attention of politicians in some countries to push us into the direction 
of strong emission reduction goals specifically in the transport sector, despite the fact that emission 
reductions in the transport sector are more costly than in many other sectors. In many countries, in 
particular in Europe, emission reductions in the transport sector are currently more costly than in 
other sectors, since carbon emissions from cars are taxed more heavily than carbon emissions in 
other sectors6, and since reduction of oil use is at least partially offset by market responses. 
Reduction of coal use is much more effective. When a society as a whole wants to reduce carbon 
emissions, it makes sense to do this at the lowest cost: this would maximize the emission-reducing 
effect for any given budget or effort. This implies more efforts and more ambitious targets in those 
sectors where it is cheaper to reduce emissions. This means that reduction of energy use in buildings 
and more efforts to cut coal use will be more cost effective ways to reduce emissions.  
One possible explanation to this is that policy is also affected by interest groups, and one can easily 
understand that carbon intensive industries want to shift some of the required efforts to the 
transport sector. Another explanation is that the public acceptability of strong policies for oil savings 
in the transport sector is increased by the fact that European car users perceive oil as three times 
more expensive than the real opportunity cost and this is the market price before taxes, so all savings 
of oil are very welcome to them. However, the net value to society of reducing expenditure on oil is 
only the cost saving net of taxes – the tax is just a transfer. In other words, each car driver, opting for 
a more fuel efficient car, does not realize that he will ultimately have to pay the saved excise taxes on 
gasoline via higher taxes somewhere else.  
6 Policy implications 
For a policy to be successful and survive in the long run, it needs to be effective, credible, and 
publicly acceptable. The former are usually requisites for the latter. Credibility is necessary to have 
the consumers and producers investing in line with the government policy, and an ineffective policy 
will not be credible in the long run7. Even an onerous policy can get public acceptance if it is 
perceived to be effective and credible; but if it is not, the public acceptance tends to wither, and then 
the policy will not survive.  Getting acceptability for the next policy measure is then likely to be more 
difficult – why trust that politicians know what they are doing this time? - and in the longer run, it 
may also erode the credibility and public acceptance of strong effective climate policies. It is 
therefore important to aim for truly effective policies. Policy analyses on how to achieve unilateral 
emission reductions are certainly not pointless, but they need to be seen in a particular context: such 
                                                          
6
 We tend to forget that the gasoline tax acts as a carbon tax . 
7
 We rely here on the mainstream political economy theory as synthesized by Besley (2006) .  
analyses answer the question what targets are reachable, how and at what cost. They do not, 
however, address the question of how global climate problems can be effectively mitigated. 
Policies aiming at optimal adaptation to future climate change—such as guarding against floods, 
switching to other crops, etc.—are of course much more credible when there is no strong belief that 
a grand sustained coalition against climate change is likely. The main advantage of adaptation is that 
every country and region benefits itself from such investments. 
So—are there no effective unilateral climate policies in the transport sector? The good news is that 
there are some. The bad news is that they are not so effective and are different from the ones most 
of us have in mind. Space constraints force us to focus more on guidelines rather than on concrete 
policies.  
Technological developments  
Conventional air pollution emissions (NOx, SO2, etc.) have been successfully reduced in many 
countries by better engine technology (catalytic technology, low sulfur diesel). The reductions of 
emissions per mile were of the order of 80 to 95%. This is usually considered as a success based on 
fast diffusion of technologies developed in one country (USA). There is no similar technology 
breakthrough available or in sight for carbon emissions in the transport sector. The cheapest options 
are still gradual improvements of fuel efficiency (cf. IEA 2009).  
Technological developments in the transport sector can be roughly separated in improvements of 
alternatives to fossil fuels (e.g. electric vehicles) and increases in fuel efficiency of conventional 
vehicles. The cost of backstop technologies is one of the determinants of cumulative oil 
consumption, as explained in section 3. Improved fuel efficiency may reduce oil consumption, which 
may reduce cumulative emissions provided either that the backstop cost is decreasing over time or 
that the marginal extraction cost is increasing.   
In principle, a country interested in carbon emission reduction in the world can achieve a larger total 
emission reduction by shifting the emphasizing from activity reduction (high car taxes, car use 
restrictions) to technology improvements. The reason is that the technology improvements can spill 
over to the rest of the world while the activity reduction is per definition local (Barla & Proost, 2012). 
Technology spillovers can occur once a technology improves efficiency in some way, e.g. fuel 
efficiency or efficient public transport. In other words, the technology must be (or have potential to 
be) sufficiently cheap to implement so that it can survive without subsidies. This means that some 
technologies potentially offering deep but expensive cuts in vehicle emissions (electric, hydrogen 
etc.) have smaller chances to be adopted by the rest of the international community than simple 
technologies (small gain in fuel efficiency, electric bicycles) as they are not ready to pay for the same 
deep emission reductions per car.  
There may also exist innovative policy inventions with a potential global impact through spillover 
effects, analogue to technological improvements. Congestion pricing may be an example, and 
perhaps certain policies to encourage fuel efficiency of vehicles.   
Electric vehicles deserve a special word of caution, as was mentioned earlier. If some region reduce 
their coal consumption, this means that global emissions are reduced by virtually the same amount, 
while reductions in oil consumption will be at least partially offset by an increase in other countries’ 
consumption. Ceteris paribus, reducing coal consumption is hence a more effective strategy than 
reducing oil consumption. It follows that replacing oil-powered vehicles with electric vehicles is 
unlikely to be a good strategy when the marginal electricity production comes from coal. The global 
reduction in oil consumption may stay almost unchanged (especially over a longer period), while coal 
consumption increases, causing aggregate carbon emissions to increase. To beat the “green 
paradox”, the electric vehicle must come at a cost lower than the cost of a conventional gasoline 
vehicle, where gasoline is priced at the extraction cost (which is a small fraction of the current 
consumer price of gasoline).  
When comparing electric vehicles with conventional engine technologies, there are two mistakes to 
be avoided. First the electric vehicle needs to be compared with the future conventional technology. 
According to Proost & Van Dender (2012) if average carbon emissions in OECD per vehicle mile are 
put at index 100, plug in hybrids and electric vehicles could achieve an index of 14 to 45. But 
conventional technology could achieve an index 45 to 80. So even conventional technologies could 
be effective in delaying carbon emissions. Second, we tend to forget that in many countries, electric 
vehicles are heavily subsidized and pay no excise taxes and this biases the comparisons, especially 
since conventional fuels and vehicles are heavily taxed. The relevant comparison for policy 
assessment would be between the cost of the electric vehicle, net of subsidies but including costs 
and possible externalities of marginal electricity generation, and the cost of the conventional vehicle, 
net of taxes but including costs for externalities such as local air pollution and climate emissions, and 
comparing  
Putting transport efficiency first won’t harm 
The main non-climate challenges for an efficient and sustainable transport system are well known: 
congestion, accidents, and air pollution in urban centers. Effective strategies build on four synergistic 
cornerstones: attractive public transport, walkability, compact land use planning, and restraints on 
car use. These can be complemented with e.g. smart vehicle technologies which can increase traffic 
safety and reduce travel costs. Such policy strategies will increase the efficiency and sustainability of 
the transport system, but the largest benefits from such policies are other than reducing GHG 
emissions. Still, such strategies will likely reduce oil consumption as well, overall carbon emissions 
will likely decrease. The problem with offsetting effects through leakage still remain, though, so net 
cumulative carbon emission reductions  will be less than they appear at face value.   
The trend8 of moving away from automobile fuel taxation as the main control and financing 
instrument is often considered as a bad signal for carbon emissions because these become cheaper 
for the car user. However, the present fuel efficiency standards combined with another pricing of the 
volume of transport (road pricing, parking etc.) will probably continue to contain the overall carbon 
emissions in the transport sector (Proost, Delhaye, Nijs, & Regemorter, 2009). The main reason is 
that addressing the other externalities will require a limitation of the volumes of traffic, certainly in 
urban areas, such that when using the same types of fuel efficient cars, the growth of carbon 
emissions will be limited.  
                                                          
8 This is a policy trend in the EU where the European Commission as well as several countries favor the 
introduction of other ways of pricing road transport. This has been implemented for trucks already in many 
countries and for cars it started at city level (London, Stockholm) and for motorways (using tolls, vignettes etc.) 
(cfr. Commission of the European Communities, 2007). 
Reducing emissions abroad may be efficient 
Many sustainability policies go for a strong limitation in the home country transport sector or even 
within a city. As counting emissions at home is easy, this has the advantage of easy accountability for 
the agency and politicians in charge. In addition, it gives a warm glow for the environmental 
consciousness of the locals. It also demonstrates to the rest of the world it can be done (“leading by 
example”), and if necessary, our industry can supply the technologies to do it.  
Deep cuts in one sector in one country are usually more costly than smaller reductions in other 
sectors or countries. Therefore, cost efficiency tells us that spreading efforts is better as long as they 
can be controlled. Within national borders, or whenever several countries join the same emission 
trading zone, this can easily be organized and controlled. Buying additional efforts in another country 
that is not interested in limiting carbon emissions may however be more difficult as the monitoring 
of the extra effort is difficult because the other government and the local polluter have different 
objectives than the government, who wants to reduce the emissions. Put in simple terms, the other 
government and its local polluter can gain by overstating the carbon reduction they sell by using a 
more polluting reference point. There are certification mechanisms to overcome this; if they are 
implemented, there is an important potential for more cost-effective emission reduction. The 
present emission trading systems do not discriminate between carbon emissions saved by reducing 
coal use and emissions saved by reducing oil use. When we take into account the green paradox, we 
know that reducing coal use may be a more effective emission reduction because there is no (or less) 
postponement of emissions as we would have for oil.  
7 Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed two problems in the formulation of sustainable transport policies. The first is 
the difficulty to reach and enforce international climate treaties, and the second are the spatial and 
intertemporal leakages. The difficulty in reaching an effective international climate agreement 
implies that most countries are not willing to pay for a strong reduction of carbon emissions. 
Intertemporal leakages imply that whenever only some countries reduce their conventional oil use, 
this may at best delay the extraction of the stock of oil, but not necessarily reduce the overall 
emissions, and at worst may even advance emissions in time (the green paradox). Both handicaps are 
very difficult to overcome and imply that the present efforts to reduce strongly carbon emissions in 
the transport sector, which are mainly oil based, may be ineffective and may need to be 
reconsidered.  
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